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IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS
In December 1972 the United States Department of Agriculture an-
nounced an impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds that
would effectively terminate the Rural Environment Assistance Program and
the Water Bank Program.' This action by the Nixon Administration was
one of a series which have resulted in the curtailment or elimination of se-
lected domestic spending programs. "The anticipated impoundment of
approximately $10 billion of appropriated funds2 will severely impact sev-
eral programs of substantial public interest including rural electrification,.
federal water pollution control (as part of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendment of 1972 which passed over presidential veto),4
federal highway funds to the states,5 and the water bank.6 This article
will investigate the nature of the impoundment problem, analyze the con-
stitutionality of such action by the executive branch, and suggest possible
courses of action that could be employed successfully in avoiding future
confrontations between Congress and the President.
I. THE NATURE OF THE IMPOUNDMENT CONTROVERSY
First and foremost it should be recognized that the controversy over
impoundment of funds by the executive department arises in the context
of the political party system. As a result, questions of separation of pow-
ers will probably be raised only to the extent opposing ideologies are in
control of the two political branches of government. In the immediate
dispute, the President's partisan supporters justify impoundment as a
proper tool in the effective management of the executive branch.7 On the
other hand those individuals of differing political sympathies 8 decry each
new announcement of a presidential cutback in spending as a serious in-
road into the fabric of American government. The arguments on both
sides are embedded in partisan politics, and in a different administration
the same men might each be speaking the words of the present opposition.
A. Pro-impoundment Contentions
The advocates of executive impoundment argue that "[s]ince the Presi-
dent lacks an item veto, he must impound the unwanted funds to preserve
ISee 31 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 4 (1973).
2Id.
- Rural Electrification Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-15 (1970).
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (1970).
5 The Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1973, § A, at 7, col. 4.
6 N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1972, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
7E.g,, 31 CoNG. Q. 291 (1973) (summarizing testimony of Deputy Attorney General
Joseph T. Sneed before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, February
6, 1973).
8 E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
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his budgetary objectives and maintain control over his own executive offi-
cials."9 Thus it is an essential power in order that the President may carry
out his duties in the nation's best interests."- Included within these presi-
dential duties is one to manage the national economy-derived from the
language of the Full Employment Act of 1946.11 That statute requires
the President to include in his annual economic report 12 a plan "to coordi-
nate and utilize all ...[the federal government's] plans, functions, and
resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining . . . [full employ-
menrt."' 3
On the basis of this economic management duty it is argued that im-
poundment is a necessary presidential tool if the policies of Congress, as
reflected in the Full Employment Act, are to be carried out.14 Implicit in
this argument is the assumption that the congressional process for con-
trolling the budget is helpflessly inefficient, and, therefore, the President
must act. This assumption, however, may not be unrealistic since Congress
operates through three separate and uncoordinated committees: one to pro-
pose legislation, another to recommend spending, and a third to consider
taxes. Only the executive branch is capable, through rapid uniform re-
sponse, of effectively managing the nation's fiscal policy.
Impoundment proponents further argue that although the Constitution
may not expressly provide for executive impoundment, neither does it men-
tion such practices as the filibuster 15 and judicial review of legislation. In-
deed, when Chief Justice Marshall established judicial review he provided
precedent for the recognition of constitutional power through refusal to
act. That is, in Marbury v. Madison,6 Marshall refused to exercise the
power given the courts by Congress when he declared a jurisdictional grant
to be unconstitutional. By establishing judicial review in relation to a
non-exercise of a power, the Chief Justice left the other branches of gov-
ernment the difficult task of challenging inaction in order to attack this
newly recognized power. In the same way, when impounding funds, the
President is refusing to exercise a power-the power to spend-in order
to establish his power to impound. The other branches of government can
challenge the impoundment of funds only by questioning his inaction.
9 Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH. L
REV. 124, 136 (1969).
10 31 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 291 (1973).
1115 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1970).
121d. § 1022.
23Id. § 1021.
14 Statement by Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of H.E.W., The Advocates (PBS) transcript
p. 14 (originally broadcast Feb. 15, 1973).
15 Fisher, supra note 9, at 137.
16 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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B. Anti-impoundment Contentions
The opposition to the executive power to impound funds focuses on
Congress as the branch of government most responsive to the will of the
people. The argument runs as follows. The Constitution gives Congress
total control over spending because the House can best "finger the pulse
of the populace," whereas the President is inherently more remote from
the constituents.' 7 Also, from a practical standpoint, Congress holds
lengthy committee hearings to evaluate proposed legislation, whereas the
President resorts to his comparatively limited staff.18 Therefore, it is rea-
soned, Congress is the most appropriate branch to have total control over
the spending power.
For some rather undeveloped arguments the constitutional language
in article II is also pointed to as evidence of congressional hegemony over
spending. The fact that the President swears he will "faithfully execute
the laws" may be interpreted to mean that he must spend all that Congress
appropriates. Thus appropriations are not just ceilings for spending, ex-
cept in certain circumstances, which are not included in the type of im-
poundment of funds now being practiced.'
At no time has Congress extended the President's power to include a
deliberate frustration of its will through termination of programs by execu-
tive order. The legislative history of the Full Employment Act of 1946
shows that Congress only intended that the President submit a plan for
national economic management and not that he take-on sole responsibility
for achieving the Act's purpose.2° Furthermore, each new enactment of
legislation should be read to supercede any older policy which is contra-
dictory. Appropriations passed after the 1946 Act must be taken as the
latest expression of congressional will.
Thus far few advocates have delved into the relevant constitutional his-
tory and case law to support their claims. This article will now consider
this less normative aspect of impoundment.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPOUNDMENT
The Constitution provides in four different clauses the basis for the im-
poundment conflict:
(1) Art. I, §1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States ....
17 Statement by Congressman Morris Udal (D. Ariz.), The Advocates (PBS) transcript p.
2 (originally broadcast Feb. 15, 1973).
1 8 Church, Impound-ment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Congressional Control
Over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. R. 1240 (1970).
10 Under the Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905-06, Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Star.
1257 and Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch. 510, § 3, 34 Star. 48-49, impoundment was to be used as a
means of timing the release of funds or of saving money when the legislative objective had been
accomplished with less than the total funds appropriated. Id. at 1241-42.
2 0 U.S. CODR CONG. SERV. 1068 (1946).
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(2) Art. I, § 8. The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States ....
(3) Art. II, § 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America ....
(4) Art. II, § 3. [The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed ....
These sections raise two immediate questions. (1) Is the power over ap-
propriations exclusive to the legislature and thus expressly denied to the
President since he has only executive power,? (2) If the President may in
some way share the power over appropriations, is he faithfully executing
the laws when he impounds appropriated funds in order to manage the
economy?
A. Historical Basis
As to whether appropriations are exclusively within the power of Con-
gress, the words of Benjamin Franklin at the Constitutional Convention
are particularly appropriate. During a discussion of which House of Con-
gress should be able to originate money bills, Franklin said, "those who
feel, can best judge,"'" meaning that the House of Representatives with
the closest contact to the electorate, should have the power to originate
money bills. The spirit of the discussion on this point, taken as a whole,
indicates that Congress, through the House, should alone be answerable to
the people for money affairs. m This would be true not only for initial ap-
propriation but also for ultimate disposition.
Another indication that appropriations were meant to be solely within
the legislature's province is a little noted clause of the Constitution re-
quiring that Congress publish "a regular statement and account of the re-
ceipts and expenditures of all public money ....... The convention, in
agreeing on this clause must have assumed that Congress would have
knowledge of what expenditures had been made, and presumably this
would occur through congressional control over disposition of appropri-
ated funds. Although it could be argued that the Congress could get this
information from the executive branch, if that were the procedure the
framers intended, they more likely than not would have included the re-
port requirement in article II as a duty of the President. It is indeed sig-
nificant that the Congress is required to disseminate the information.
Even if it can be established that the President is able to participate
in the "appropriation" process, is it within his power to impound appro-
priated funds in order to faithfully execute the law? In order to answer
this question, inquiry must be made into the nature of the executive power
2 1 J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CoNvENTIoN 306 (spec. ed. 1893).
22 1d. at 303-07.
23 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
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bestowed upon the President. In their discussion of how to describe the
executive's powers, the framers of the Constitution decided to delete a
phrase that said the President's powers were to be "not legislative nor ju-
dicial in their nature."' Their rationale was that such a phrase was un-
necessary since they intended the remainder of the clause to imply exactly
that meaning and that to include the phrase would be redundant. Thus
the authors of the Constitution made clear that the power to execute the
laws was not to include the legislative function of changing a statute from
the form in which it was enacted. The framers did, however, provide the
President with a limited power in legislative affairs.
The President was given the power to veto legislation in its entirety
after it had passed both houses. In the discussion concerning this power
the convention also considered an absolute veto.25 The fact that this idea
was ultimately rejected in favor of the present system can be attributed to
the intended purpose of the veto. Primarily the veto was to assure that
Congress would not exceed its authority, and it was not to serve as a check
on congressional wisdom." The President was refused an absolute veto so
that he would not become overly powerful2 T Although an absolute nega-
tive power for the executive branch would have best served the purpose of
controlling Congress, the limited veto was considered sufficient because
if a proper porportion of each branch should be required to overrule the
objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an abso-
lute negative. It would rarely, if ever, happen that the Executive . . .
would have firmness enough to resist the Legislature, unless backed by a
certain part of the body itself. 8
Thus it was the widely-held feeling in 1789 that absolute veto would be
dangerous to the separation of powers as would be the absence of any veto
power. Therefore, to insure that neither Congress nor the President would
exceed its authority, the present system requiring a two-thirds majority vote
to override a veto, was agreed upon.
It is interesting that at no time did the discussion at the Constitutional
Convention include an item veto, that is, the power to negate only parts of
a bill. This power must have been considered unnecessary since the main
purpose of providing for a veto was not to enable the executive's prefer-
ence to prevail over that of Congress, but rather to enable him to protect
himself in power dashes with the Congress."
2 4 Madison, supra note 23, at 87.
25 Id. at 398-409.
261d. at 716.
27d. at 107.
281d, at 103.
29 During the first several presidential terms, the veto was used sparingly and then usually
for the purpose of preventing the passage of "unconstitutional" legislation. R. EGGBR & J.
HARRIS, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 51 (1963).
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In view of the fact that an absolute veto was rejected by the convention
it is relevant to consider whether, in fact, that is the ultimate effect of
presidential impoundment of funds. When the President can refuse to
spend funds appropriated by Congress over his veto, he has, in effect,
claimed an absolute veto power. The legislation is then virtually a nullity
despite the fact that Congress voted to override the veto. Such conduct
negates the limitation of the veto power as its creators conceived it. The
President should not be able to use impoundment as a means of vetoing
bills absolutely-a power which has been expressly denied him.
Further illumination on the nature of presidential power is provided
in a series of articles by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton-The
Federalist."' In Number 48, Madison explained the need for overlap of
the branches of government so that each may help preserve the separation
of powers, especially against usurpation by the legislature? 1 He singles
out the strength of the legislature over the executive because of the latter's
"narrower compass" and simple nature. Thus Madison recognized that
the President had very limited power to assert his will over Congress.
In Number 73, Hamilton discussed the veto, the chosen method by
which the President can maintain the separation of powers and stated that
the situation for which the veto is "chiefly designed [isl that of an im-
mediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive."32 Hamil-
ton did recognize, however, as did the framers, that occasionally the veto
would be used to submit a law for revision which seemed to "evidently
and palpably sacrifice" the public good. But as far as impoundment is
concerned, the relevancy of Hamilton's discussion is that he clearly indi-
cates that the President was not meant to replace the will of Congress with
his own. Perhaps paper Number 69 by Hamilton, is the most enlighten-
ing in respect to the President's power to impound. He stated that under
the Constitution the President "can prescribe no rules concerning the com-
merce or currency of the nation." 3  This prohibition presumably would
include the power to impound funds that have been appropriated by Con-
gress pursuant to the exercise of the commerce and currency powers.
B. The Case Law Relevant to Impoundment
There have been relatively few cases which deal with the President's
duty to faithfully execute the laws, although the question arose in an early
case, Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes.34 In that case Stokes con-
tracted with the Postmaster General to transport the mail, and in return
3 0 A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON & J. JAY, THE FEDERAULST (edited by B. Wright, 1961).
31 Id. at 344-45.
32Id. at 471.
-33ld. at 450.
34 37 U.S. 524 (1838).
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he received certain credits and allowances. A new Postmaster General,
Kendall, then took office and re-charged Stokes for the amount of the cred-
its, claiming that they were void. To settle the dispute, Congress passed
an act directing the Solicitor of the Treasury to determine the proper
amount to be credited. Kendall, however, still refused to credit the entire
amount determined by the Solicitor and his action was finally reviewed by
the Supreme Court. In finding that the Postmaster General was not acting
under an extension of presidential power when he refused to grant the
credit, the Court said:
It was urged at the bar, that the postmaster general was alone subject
to the direction and control of the President, with respect to the execution
of the duty imposed upon him by this law, and this right of the President
is claimed, as growing out of the obligation imposed upon him by the
constitution, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This is a,
doctrine that cannot receive the sanction of this court. It would be vesting
in the President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its
support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which,
if carried out in its results, to all cases falling within it, would be cloth-
ing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of con-
gress, and paralyze the administration of justice.
To contend, that the obligation imposed on the President to see the
laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a
novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible 35
The situation in Kendall is directly analogous to the problem of im-
poundment; both involve congressional enactments requiring a sum of
money be paid out and refusal by the executive branch to carry out the will
of the legislature. Both situations would allow an executive official some
degree of discretion, but as the Court pointed out the President does not
have the power to forbid the law's execution.
A case which might be read to suggest the opposite conclusion about
the general power to impound is In re Neagle.38 There, the President had
ordered that a federal deputy act as bodyguard for a Justice of the Supreme
Court whose life had been threatened. In carrying out his duties he killed
an attacker and was arrested and charged by local officials. The Supreme
Court issued a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he had been per.
forming a duty within the President's power and was, therefore, protected
by the aegis of the federal government. As a source for this power, the
Supreme Court credited the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. Thus, the Court pointed out that the President has some in-
herent powers to do certain acts upon his own initiative, and presumably
some advocates of impoundment would build upon this to support their
own cause. But Neagle is distinguishable from the impoundment situa-
s5 Id. at 612-13.
36135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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tion, for as the Neagle court pointed out, in that case there was no action
by Congress, and it was this void which parented the needed presidential
power."7 In the case of impounding appropriated funds, the entire con-
flict is focused upon the fact that there is a contrary congressional enact-
ment. So although Neagle established that the President had powers be-
yond "the enforcement of acts of Congress," it carries no weight in a case
where Congress has acted.
A third case exploring the limits of presidential power is United States
v. Midwest Oil Co.," which stands for the proposition that a combination
of a long-standing practice and congressional silence gives rise to a presi-
dential power. In deciding that the President could halt the sale of public
land despite congressional authorization for the transactions, the Court
said:
Both [sic] officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to
any long-continued action of the Executive Department-on the presump-
tion that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often
repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.39
The precise meaning of "long-continued action" is not dear, but the type
of practice occurring in Midwest Oil whereby the executive branch sought
to control the rapid loss of public land to oil speculators, is said to date
"from an early period in the history of the government."4 o It is safe to
estimate that the practice was at least 100 years old,41 whereas the period
over which the impoundment of funds has been practiced is substantially
less. Commentators report that "[e]xecutive impoundment lost its charac-
ter as an economy measure and became a full-fledged policy tool early in
the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." 42 That was only forty
years ago; possibly not enough to merit status as a long standing practice.
But even if forty years is sufficient to create a Midwest Oil type power,
such a power cannot survive congressional attack. Congressional silence
does not serve to create a constitutional presidential power, but at most a
power bestowed by the authority of Congress. Granting, arguendo, that
congressional silence can be so read, the Congress can certainly retract a
power which it has granted. Therefore, as soon as congressional silence
on the subject of impoundment is broken, the President will have lost this
acquired power to accomplish political objectives through limitations on
spending.
38 See id. at 64-66.
s8236 U.S. 459 (1915).
39 Id. at 472-73.
401d. at 469 (footnote omitted).
41 The exact age of the practice is not essential to this discussion. It is only important to
know that the practice in Midwest Oil had a history more than twice as long as that of impound-
ment.
42 Church, supra note 18, at 1242.
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Perhaps the most famous case involving an adjudication of presidential
power is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,4 the steel seizure case.
Faced with the threat of a steel strike damaging to the national defense,
President Truman ordered that the mills be seized and operated by the
Secretary of Commerce. The only basis of authority claimed for such ac-
tion was the general constitutional powers of the President. Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, held the seizure to be an unconstitutional act. His
opinion makes it clear that the seizure power was found to be legislative
and thus denied to the President." Furthermore, the activity challenged
there not only invaded the legislative realm, but also violated the intent
of Congress. During consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress re-
jected an amendment which would have authorized government seizures
in such cases of emergency."
Under the precedent of Youngstown Sheet & Tube, if the impound-
ment power were vested exclusively in the legislature, presidential action
in this regard would be unconstitutional. The key question thus becomes
whether that action is exclusive. The Constitution specifically directs Con-
gress to provide for the general welfare, presumably through spending pro-
grams; other than the veto power, the Constitution grants no check, or
other control over spending to the executive branch, unless it is shown to
be an implicit power. Although the precedent of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube is not determinative as to this type of implicit power, it does serve
to show that the executive's inherent powers are limited to those flowing
directly from the powers expressed in the Constitution.
Viewed collectively, the four cases cited above establish the proposi-
tions that (1) the President may intervene in what might be considered
the legislative domain if Congress has ignored or failed to respond to an
immediate problem, and (2) he may similarly act when Congress has al-
lowed him to do so as part of a long standing practice; however (3) the
President may not interfere with the legislature when it has been granted
exclusive power and has acted, and (4) his duty to execute the laws does
not include the power to deny execution, lest he interfere with congression-
al intent. Therefore, presidential impoundment of funds is an infringe-
ment upon a congressional power, and unless some paramount independent
executive power exists to justify this conduct the President is acting uncon-
stitutionally.46
43343 U.S. 579 (1952).
441d. at 587-88.
451d. at 586.
46 Note that in the area of domestic affairs, the President has few independent substantive
powers. Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign. Affairs Power Over Foreign Aid: Part I,
1970 DuKE L.J. 293, 296 (1970).
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III. THE GRAY AREA OF LEGITIMATE IMPOUNDMENT
The clash of power between governmental branches may arise in three
possible situations: (1) the President may be acting without an indepen-
dent constitutional power over a given subject matter; (2) the President
may possess an exclusive constitutional power over a given subject matter;
or (3) the powers of the President and Congress may be concurrent. The
first situation and its assessment were discussed above; it is the latter two
situations that represent gray areas of the law in which impoundment by
the executive may be permissible.
The situation-two type of conflict would occur whenever Congress at-
tempted to affect matters solely within the control of the executive. If
Congress were to attempt to force recognition of a foreign government,
which would result should Congress appropriate funds to establish an em-
bassy in Cuba, it would be usurping a power traditionally reserved to the
President. That is, the recognition of foreign governments has generally
been considered an area over which the President has exclusive control.
The President would be forced to defend his powers, and the question be-
comes what means are available to him. As earlier noted the veto power
was the tool designed by the framers of the Constitution to enable the Pres-
ident to protect his office. But if the veto is overridden, the President
should be allowed to impound funds pending a judicial resolution. He is
in effect refusing to execute a statute which he finds to be unconstitutional.
Whether this refusal manifests itself in impoundment of funds or some
other form of executive action is irrelevant. The President is bound by the
very terms of his oath of office to preserve and protect the Constitution;"
therefore he would violate his oath by enforcing an unconstitutional
statute.
The situation in which Congress and the President have independent
concurrent powers is the hardest to resolve: for example, if Congress were
to declare war against a country and yet the President as commander-in-
chief refused to order the military to begin fighting. Both branches would
be acting under a specific and equally valid grant of power. Whether the
President could properly impound funds in this situation is outside the
scope of this article. The most that can be said about such clashes of power
is that a case by case evaluation is required. For purposes of this article
it is only necessary to point out that, in the case of the impoundment of
congressionally appropriated funds to eliminate a domestic program, the
President is without the authority necessary to put him on an equal footing
with Congress.
47Id. at 315.
48 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
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IV. POSSIBLE METHODS TO END IMPOUNDMENT
An inherent problem in relying on litigation to solve the impoundment
issue is that a decision may be so long delayed that the President's term
may end prior to the court's resolution.49 As an alternative, the Congress
has considered other means to force the expenditire of impounded ap-
propriations. Typical of proposed legislation is Senator Ervin's "Impound-
ment Control Bill" (S. 373), "which would require the President to notify
Congress by special message whenever he intends to withhold appropri-
ated funds, and would prevent him from continuing the action after 60
days unless Congress approved it by concurrent resolution."5  However-,
the same problems would still be at hand to hinder any attempts to fight
impoundment after the fact. If the President felt called upon to ignore
the first appropriation, there is no reason to believe he would alter his atti-
tude as to future efforts to reappropriate the same measure."' Therefore,
the bills such as Ervin's may well prove ineffective, since the President
could repeatedly use the 60-day "grace period" to curtail spending or use
other tactics to circumvent the legislative intent. For example, by not dis-
closing his intent to direct the impoundment of appropriations, the Presi-
dent could continue the practice with only after-the-fact challenge. And,
if questioned about the absence of recent spending, the executive branch
could simply respond by claiming administrative hold-ups and indicating
anticipated future release.
An amended Ervin Bill,-' which has now passed the Senate, tacitly rec-
ognizes that Congress is inept at controlling the expenditure of the total
appropriations. The President is, therefore, allowed to cut spending to a
4 9 There are two types of judicial remedies which might be available in an action to force
the expenditure of funds. For one, a writ of mandamus could be granted directing a cabinet
officer to order the release of the funds. Whether such an action would succeed would hinge
upon whether the court perceived the expenditure as a ministerial or discretionary act Kendall
v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838), recognizes that mandamus is only proper
to command performance of a ministerial act.
The other cause of action which might be successful is a suit for injunctive relief. The
problem with such a suit is that the injunction must be couched in prohibitory terms. That is,
a mandatory injunction may not be used when it is merely a substitute for a writ of mandamus.
See Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934). Faced with this very situation, Eighth Circuit
in State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, No. 72-1512 (8th Cir., filed Apr. 2, 1973), hurdled the
word choice difficulty by enjoining the Secretary of Transportation from continuing to withhold
funds.
5031 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 247 (1973).
51 ld. at 668. The substance of remarks made by Eric Thor, Administrator of the Farm
Cooperative Service, according to Rep. John Melcher (D. Mont.):
If Congress passes mandatory legislation, the President will veto it. If Congress over-
rides the veto, the President will refuse to spend money for it. In that event Congress
has no recourse except to take the matter to the courts. If it goes to the courts, the
litigation will be so prolonged that no final decision will be reached until there is a
new President.
Id.
52 Id. at 821.
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given ceiling provided he reduces each program proportionately. Besides
the fact that it too can be ignored by the executive department, this bill,
fails to recognize that some programs are more important than others and
that some can better withstand a budget cut.
From an academic viewpoint, a more basic problem with the bills pro-
.posed to date is their implicit recognition of the validity of impound-
ment.5" Through attempts to regulate, rather than attack outright, Con-
gress concedes propriety. As this article has shown, such a concession is
unnecessary in view of the strong constitutional arguments against im-
poundment.
Ideally Congress should require the President to request cuts in funding
in the same manner as he now requests supplemental appropriations. In
this way each cut could be considered on its merits. However, such a plan
would not avoid the problems of presidential disregard or circumvention.
Congress has begun the program which may best solve the impound-
ment question-committee reform in the budget process.54 A proposal
submitted by a special 32-member committee calls for a new plan of bud-
get procedures. Accordingly, Congress would pass an overall spending
ceiling, divided into annual and non-annual appropriations. Tentative in-
dividual appropriations would be passed, and, if at the end of the process
the total of the individual amounts exceeds the ceiling, a wrap-up bill
would be passed to make the necessary cuts in the earlier bills. The wrap-
up bill is the key to this plan of controlling the budget process in Congress
and out of the hands of the President.
By successfully holding spending to the level it decides is optimum,
Congress can dissolve the political leverage traditionally used by the Presi-
dent to justify impoundment. Also with a more manageable procedure,
chances are better that the President and Congress will be able to agree
upon an appropriate spending limit and the means to stay within it.
Mark B. Cohn
53 See id. at 247-48 (comments by Ralph Nader).
54 N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
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